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Abstract: Poland’s National Security Council (Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, RBN) 
is defined in the country’s Constitution as organ doradczy Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej w  zakresie wewnętrznego i  zewnętrznego bezpieczeństwa państwa (officially 
translating into: “the advisory organ to the President of the Republic regarding 
internal and external security of the State”). Against that background, this article 
uses analysis of policy practice as it seeks to explain whether the NSC truly plays 
that role of advisory organ, or is more in the nature of a  coordinating-and-consulting 
body. To address this research topic, three areas have been identified for broader 
and deeper consideration, i.e.  the means of selecting Council Members, the frequency 
with which Sittings have been convened, and the subject matter addressed at those 
Sittings.
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Introduction
Challenges of various different types are faced by the state as what 
Georg Jellinek perceived as: “an association of sedentary people vested 
with original authority”1. From among these, concern for the security 
of the state obviously has its own special place. And while this was 
once identified mainly with the military sphere, today this is thought 
of as a multi-aspect phenomenon. Indeed, in a  globalised world there 
is seen to be dynamic change in the threats the state and its institu-
tions need to deal with2. In that connection, a  security guarantee 
demands multidimensional action linked with the proper identification 
of threats, the taking of relevant decisions to safeguard against these 
arising, and ultimately – where the situation demands it – optimal 
reaction.
Through the process by which the state has developed over the 
long term, a  number of institutions have been founded with activity 
concentrating around different security aspects. These include both 
highly-specialised services and agencies and organs of public authority. 
Entities within the first group have as their guiding principles political 
neutrality, professionalism, and a desire to achieve the substantive reso-
lution of problems on the basis of the knowledge of those engaged in 
their activity, in so doing using the latest technologies and all possible 
tools to favour the discharge of the tasks put before them. In contrast, 
the second group based around political decisions indicate directions 
of action, set out priorities and create conditions in which specialised 
entities are able to operate.
However, operating in the surroundings of both types of institution 
mentioned are advisory bodies of different types. The specialised agen-
cies above all draw on substantive policy advice, whose foundation is 
academic knowledge often arising out of many years of study of some 
defined aspect of our reality. Public-authority bodies also make use of 
substantive advice, but in their case they also need to engage in political 
consulting, given the need for certain policy (but also political) objec-
1 Cited after G. Jellinek, Ogólna nauka o państwie. Book II. Nauka o państwie z punktu widzenia 
społecznego. Book III. Nauka o państwie z punktu widzenia prawnego, translated by M. Balsigie-
rowa and M. Przedborski, Warsaw 1924, p. 50.
2 R. Radek, Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego i Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego jako instytu-
cje wspomagające reagowanie na zagrożenia – aspekty normatywne i  praktyka polityczna, [in:] 
K. Czornik, M. Lakomy (eds.), Dylematy polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski na początku drugiej 
dekady XXI wieku, Katowice 2014, p. 356.
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tives to be achieved3. There are concrete situations in which tensions 
may emerge between the two forms and mechanisms by which advice 
is sought, with the main outcome of that being to reveal just how com-
plicated a decision-making sphere and associated political activity may 
actually be.
The topic and objective of the article
An awareness of the significance of parliaments and their crucial 
importance to contemporary democratic regimes raises a need to high-
light how functions in the organisation and arrangement of state policy 
are ascribed to the Executive. The latter becomes the key element in 
the decision-making process as state policy is pursued4. And, in all of 
that, priority rank is obviously assigned to the given state’s internal and 
external security, bearing in mind the fundamental significance of these 
aspects for its very existence.
In the Polish legal order as it concerns the governance system, the 
Council of Ministers is the body whose task is to “ensure the internal 
security of the state” (under Art. 146, para. 4, point 7 of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Poland) and its “external security” (under point 8 
of the same paragraph), while also “exercising general control in the 
field of national defence (under point 11 of the same paragraph). Nev-
ertheless, there is also a  second organ forming part of the Executive 
– i.e. the President of the republic of Poland – who is ascribed tasks by 
the Constitution in regard to the safeguarding of key values crucial to 
the state’s existence, i.e. sovereignty, security and territorial inviolability 
and integrity (all under Art. 126, para. 2). While it is true that these 
values are in fact to be defended by every organ and body of public 
authority in Poland, there is an explicit assigning of such a  role to the 
President, with this justified in line with the status of this post-holder as 
the supreme representative of the Polish state5. Beyond that, the oath of 
office sworn by the President before the National Assembly (as provided 
for in Art. 130 of the Constitution) includes the section: “… będę strzegł 
3 A. Kopka, M. Minkenberg, D.  Piontek, Doradztwo polityczne i  lobbing w międzynarodowej 
perspektywie porównawczej, [in:] A. Kopka, D. Piontek, M. Minkenberg (eds.), Doradztwo 
polityczne i lobbing w parlamentarnym procesie decyzyjnym. Polska i Niemcy w perspektywie porów-
nawczej, Kraków–Nowy Targ 2018, p. 14.
4 J. Blondel, Comparative Government. An Introduction, London 1995, pp. 268–269.
5 L. Garlicki, Polskie prawo konstytucyjne, zarys wykładu, Warsaw 2006, p. 260.
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niezłomnie godności Narodu, niepodległości i bezpieczeństwa Państwa” (trans-
lated into English as: “I shall steadfastly safeguard the dignity of the 
Nation, the independence and security of the State…”). There is thus 
no ambiguity here when it comes to the idea that care for the security 
of the state needs to be a priority aspect of the President of Poland’s 
activity.
As regards the constitutional and statutory powers of the President of 
Poland vis-à-vis state-security issues, there is a notable requirement relat-
ing to joint action with a second body of the Executive. This manifests 
itself in – among other things – situations relating to external threats, 
the need to bring in martial law or states of emergency, the adopted 
model by which leadership over the Armed Forces is to be exercised, 
entitlements as regards nominations and so on. The President of Poland 
remains a key organ of public authority co-participating in the process 
by which state security is guaranteed. Also attesting to this is the fact 
that constitutional rank has been gained by the advisory body to the 
President in matters of internal and external security that the National 
Security Council represents. Given that the Head of State is in a position 
to call various auxiliary bodies into being within the President’s Chancel-
lery (Kancelaria Prezydenta) framework, the circumstance of the NSC (as 
an “advisory organ”) finding its place in the Constitution is of a specific 
nature. It may be explained by the relevant nature of the material that its 
activity is to involve, as well as the role and significance of the President 
where state security is concerned.
A basic aim of this article is thus to account for the significance of 
the National Security Council against the background of policy or politi-
cal practice. Specifically, the research topic was formulated around the 
matter of how the Council may be conceptualised as an organ offering 
advice to the President. Indeed, it was in connection with a topic defined 
in this way that the hypothesis adopted held that – depending on the way 
in which the Constitutional wording “advisory organ” is understood, the 
NSC may take on the character of an advisory organ or body in the strict 
sense of the term; or else be more of a  coordination-and-consultation 
body; or even be nothing more than a forum at which different entities 
active in the sphere of state security are able to cooperate.
The effort to verify this hypothesis saw work carried out in relation 
to three aspects of the Council’s operations and functioning. In the first 
place, the composition of the NSC was analysed. It has been worth check-
ing what directed successive Presidents (from Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
through to Andrzej Duda) as they appointed different people to the 
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Council. By identifying some kinds of rules by which people were chosen 
for invitations to serve on this body, we might obtain a key premise by 
which to understand the way in which successive Presidents conceived 
of that body, in terms of its nature.
In the second place, the subject of analysis was the frequency with 
which the NSC was found to be performing its tasks. That approach of 
course denoted an assumption that the convening of Council Sittings 
did mean significance being assigned to this organ by a given President 
in office.
And finally – in the third place – there seemed to be full justification 
for analysing what issues had been the subject matter of work carried out 
by the Council, given the way that that might link up with an attempt 
to determine whether or not the organ had helped the President(s) in 
their pursuit of certain solutions (and thus been proactive in character), 
or whether the role had led to the NSC dealing with defined matters 
that were a consequence of events either ongoing within Poland and its 
political system or in its surroundings (suggesting a reactive as opposed 
to proactive aspect to the NSC). It was also felt to be worth checking – 
via the activity of the Council – which Presidents regarded internal or 
else external security as the matter of overriding importance; as well as 
worth detecting whether subject matter taken up extended beyond the 
military sphere into other aspects of security. An attempt was also made 
to determine the extent to which the work of the NSC translated into 
actual decisions taken by the President of Poland.
This article takes account of the 57 Sittings of the National Security 
Council taking place in the years 1998–2020, and thus over almost the 
entire period in which the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
has so far been in force. The first such meeting was on February 20th 1998 
and involved the Council convened by Aleksander Kwaśniewski, 
while the 57th was held on March 23rd 2020, and had the status of 
last Sitting during the first term in office of President Andrzej Duda 
(see Annex).
In order for the research objective set to be pursued, it was necessary 
for several methods to be applied. While identifying the Council’s place 
within the system of state organs and bodies required institutional and 
legal analysis, the effort to characterise the practical side of the NSC 
needed at least partial resort to the historical method, especially via 
a material dimension manifesting itself in an attempt to link up differ-
ent facts into a  real whole. Resort to the decision-making method was 
also justified.
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The genesis of the National Security Council
Poland’s regaining of independence in 1918 combined with difficult 
experiences from the past to ensure that the state re-established as the 
so-called Second Republic gave much consideration to matters of state 
security. The subject was first and foremost broached in relation to pos-
sible threats from external entities in the international environment, 
and hence on proper preparation of the country for defending itself in 
the circumstances of foreign aggression. Unsurprisingly, this version of 
security was taken to boil down mainly to the military aspect. And in 
line with the fact that this particular subject matter was connected with 
the key interests of the state, the entity engaged in such matters was the 
Head of State, i.e. the President of the Republic. And in the space of just 
under two decades (of the inter-War period), different Presidents called 
into being (and presided over) several different bodies whose activity was 
mainly to perform tasks relating to opinion-giving, advice and consulta-
tion, as well as coordination, in respect of state security. 
As early as in 1921, a Decree from Poland’s Supreme Commander 
Józef Piłsudski brought into existence a  two-level War Council (Pełna 
and Ścisła) that was an advisory and opinion-giving body when it came 
to Acts relating to the Armed Forces, matters relating to the arming 
and supplying of those Forces, and the organisation of the Army in 
general6. Five years later – by virtue of a Regulation of the President of 
Poland dated October 25th 19267 – a Committee for the Defence of the 
State (Komitet Obrony Państwa) was established, with its remit including 
the issuing of opinions and guidelines in matters of defence. In turn, 
1936 brought the establishment of Komitet Obrony Rzeczypospolitej8 (the 
Committee for the Defence of the Republic). Its work was to consider 
matters of defence, and to set guidelines for the government, including 
as regards the coordination of any work by which Poland was made ready 
to defend itself.
In turn, the era of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL) saw a quite-sim-
ilarly-titled Komitet Obrony Kraju brought into existence, the change in 
6 R. Czarnecka, Organizacja Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych (MSWojsk.) w  latach 1918–1921, 
„Biuletyn Wojskowej Służby Archiwalnej” 2005, no. 27, p. 109, http://web.archive.org/
web/20160305062703/http://archiwumcaw.wp.mil.pl/biuletyn/b27/b27_5.pdf (28.12.2020).
7 The Dziennik Ustaw Official Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland of 1926, no. 108, 
item 633.
8 Dekret Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej z dnia 9 maja 1936 r. o sprawowaniu zwierzchnictwa nad Siłami 
Zbrojnemi i organizacji naczelnych władz wojskowych w czasie pokoju, The Dziennik Ustaw Official 
Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland of 1936, no. 38, item 286.
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name being from “State” to “Country”. At the outset, this was “the Com-
mittee of the Council of Ministers in matters of defence”9. However, from 
1983 on, the competences extended beyond defence into state security10. 
The constitutionalisation of this body in 1989 involved its coming to be 
presided over by the President of what was still at that point People’s 
Poland11. However, the location of this KOK within the country’s system 
of governance had failed to be defined precisely, given linkage with both 
the Head of State of Poland and the country’s Government. 
It was then in 1991, by virtue of an Ordinance of the President of 
the Republic of Poland (no longer People’s) that a Bureau of National 
Security (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego or BBN) was called into being. 
This was subordinated to the Secretary of the Committee on National 
Defence (Komitet Obrony Kraju or KOK) and was affiliated with the 
Chancellery of the President. Then, in line with further amendment of 
the Act on the universal obligation to defend Poland, the BBN gained 
a definition as an organ assisting the Committee (KOK). At the same 
time, the Bureau was that of the President of Poland, who defined both 
the body itself and its scope of action, as well as supporting it financially 
from budget means allocated to the Chancellery of the President12. Not-
withstanding the way in which the BBN was not a decision-making body 
from any formal point of view (being there merely to assist the KOK), 
in practice at least its position was becoming stronger and stronger – 
as it was for example within the BBN that many analyses were made 
ready, with work on the draft Polish Doctrine on Defence also being 
done here13.
From the beginning of his time in office, President Lech Wałęsa 
sought to do away with Komitet Obrony Kraju, given the way its People’s 
Republic origins looked burdensome to a  state now following a demo-
cratic path of development. In that connection, a draft was even pre-
 9 Ustawa z  dnia 21 listopada 1967 r. o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej 
Ludowej, Art. 5, para. 1, The Dziennik Ustaw Official Journal of Laws of the Republic of 
Poland of 1967, no. 44, item 220.
10 Ustawa z dnia 21 listopada 1983 r. o zmianie ustawy o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Polskiej 
Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, Art. 1, point 1, the Dziennik Ustaw Official Journal of Laws of the 
Republic of Poland of 1983, no. 61, item 278.
11 Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, The 
Dziennik Ustaw Official Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland of 1989, no. 19, item 101.
12 Ustawa z dnia 25 października 1991 r. o zmianie ustawy o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Polskiej 
Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej oraz niektórych innych ustaw, art. 1 pkt 7, The Dziennik Ustaw Official 
Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland of 1991, no. 113, item 491.
13 J. Ciapała, Prezydent w systemie ustrojowym Polski (1989–1997), Warsaw 1999, p. 187.
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pared by which KOK would convert into a National Security Council 
with the Polish name Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego14. However, the 
reality emerged as much more complicated. While it is true that Rada 
Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego was referred to in the Small Constitution 
(Mała Konstytucja) of 1992 – as an advisory body to the President of 
the Republic of Poland, in matters of the overall governance of the 
state as regards its external and internal security15, this did not seem 
to be tantamount to any closing down of Komitet Obrony Kraju, even as 
a deconstitutionalisation of the latter did take place. However, in spite of 
the unambiguous nature of this signal of intent that KOK should cease 
to exist16, the body was only actually wound up at the beginning of the 
21st century. As if that were not enough, it proved (politically) impos-
sible for any National Security Council to be called into being during 
the time the Small Constitution was in effect17. In practice, the body 
that forms the main subject of the present analysis commenced its story 
with the entry into force of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
of April 2nd 199718. This in turn justifies this article’s time frame for 
analysis, which begins in 1998.
The composition of the National Security Council
Under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the National 
Security Council gains description as an advisory organ to the Presi-
dent. However, the country’s basic law offers no other provisions defin-
ing more precisely what that notion of advisory organ actually means. 
In principle, it would be possible to accept that anybody can have an 
advisory role; even as it is clear that not everybody is able to advise in 
a manner that emerges as suitable for or useful to the entity who is to 
be assisted. Thus, a  fundamental question needing to be posed in this 
14 W. Fehler, Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego jako konstytucyjny organ państwowy, [in:] T. Słomka, 
A. Materska-Sosnowska (eds.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1997 r., ciągłość i zmiana, 
Warsaw 2012, p. 234.
15 Ustawa konstytucyjna z  dnia 17 października 1992 r. o wzajemnych stosunkach między władzą 
ustawodawczą i wykonawczą Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o samorządzie terytorialnym, Art. 34, 
The Dziennik Ustaw Official Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland of 1992, no. 84, 
item 426.
16 J. Ciapała, Prezydent w systemie ustrojowym Polski…, p. 191.
17 W. Fehler, Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego…, pp. 235–238.
18 The Dziennik Ustaw Official Journal of Laws of Official Journal of Laws of the Republic of 
Poland of 1997, no. 78, item 483.
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connection concerns the premises that ought to be in place as a person 
is  – or is not – invited to work in a  collegiate organ whose aim is to 
supply advice. That question assumes particular importance where the 
advisory “service” is to be made use of by a public organ – and one of 
a political nature in the case of the institution of President of Poland. 
Who would have a predestination to work in such a body? Should the 
key premise deciding whether or not a person is co-opted on to such 
a body be expert (and/or scientific) knowledge? It might be that mat-
ters of still greater importance are skill and competence arising out of 
experience acquired in different posts (including public posts) held in 
domains linked with the activity of the given advisory body. 
Equally, or similarly, it is possible to envisage how membership of 
such an assembled body would (should) be reserved for those who at the 
given time hold defined (a restricted number of) posts in the system of 
organs of public authority. Or perhaps the makeup of an assembly of this 
kind should be entirely political in nature, with seats in this way taken by 
representatives of the political circles close to the President (from which 
that President originates)? Or perhaps a more justifiable approach is one 
in which composition specifically brings in representatives of a  broad 
spectrum of political circles and forces? 
The five above ways in which to potentially select members of an 
advisory organ could by no means be thought to exhaust the list of pos-
sibilities – also to the extent that we may not preclude a President being 
motivated or guided by still-other premises, or by more than one from 
the above list. And in all of this there can be no doubt that, in the face 
of the lack of an unequivocal definition of the notion that is advisory 
organ or body, the premises underpinning choice of participants may 
offer an important indication as to what the President expects from such 
a gathering of people. And that may in turn assist with an understanding 
of the role an advisory organ is in reality to play.
If membership of the NSC was determined by the possession of 
professional knowledge, then this would be an expert body. That would 
not preclude the status of advisory organ, but the advice given would 
have a  foundation in science. Where the features determining some-
one’s appointment to the Council were skill and competence, the organ 
would have a chance to serve an advisory one, even as in this case the 
advice would concentrate more on the “prompting” of practical solu-
tions. Where membership were to be linked with the simultaneous hold-
ing of posts as organs of public authority, then the assumption would 
have to be that the advisory nature of the institution was limited to 
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a marked degree, in favour of the fulfilment of a role in coordination and 
consultation. 
In turn, were nominations to the NSC to be received by those linked 
to political circles close to the President, that would denote the confer-
ment upon it of an advisory capacity, even if that would probably be 
one giving strategic advice, with substantive advice only playing a  far 
more minor role. At the same time, with the choice of membership 
being of this kind, the gathering for the purpose of advice-giving would 
have to be seen as lacking any plurality of views. And the likelihood of 
already-held convictions being reinforced, while there is no truck with 
views not accepted or unacceptable, might work to limit the effectiveness 
with which any advisory role is performed. 
However, a deficit in regard to pluralistic views could be made good 
were invitations to participate to be sent out to representatives of dif-
ferent political circles. That would provide for acquaintanceship with 
a wide spectrum of opinion and standpoints in matters important to 
the security of the state19. However, we do not know if such an organ 
would in fact be competent to give advice. Perhaps it would simply be 
a forum at which to exchange views, with the best case being one involv-
ing cooperation in matters of state security – assuming the Council of 
this profile possessed or developed the skill to reach compromises and 
do policy by way of consensus?
It is therefore worth looking at successive compositions of the 
National Security Council; and the first of these was the one called into 
being by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski shortly after the 1997 Con-
stitution of the Republic of Poland entered into force. This took place 
on January 20th 1998, with 9 people included. The President’s “key” in 
accordance with which participants were selected assumed that seats on 
the NSC should be taken by those holding important posts in the system 
of state bodies and organs. In that connection, the Marshals (Speakers) 
of Sejm and Senat were included, the Prime Minister, two Deputy Prime 
Ministers (who were at the same time Ministers of Finance and of Inter-
nal Affairs and Administration), the Ministers of National Defence and 
Foreign Affairs, the President of the National Bank of Poland and the 
Head of the Bureau of National Security (as NSC Secretary). 
It is here worth stressing immediately that nominations to this first 
manifestation of the Council took place at a time of co-habitation, mean-
19 J. Juchniewicz, Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, «Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego» 2015, 
no. 2 (24), p. 122.
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ing that the adopted way of selecting Members denoted political domi-
nation by political circles in competition with the one from which the 
President himself originated. In those circumstances, could the NSC 
really serve in the role of advisory organ, given a majority makeup of 
politicians in some sense “against” the incumbent Head of State? It 
seems rather improbable. Thus the Council was instead supposed to 
have been in the nature of a coordination-and-consultation body, above 
all in an institutional dimension. Yet it was to be an organ operating 
under the auspices of the President in a position to guarantee harmoni-
ous cooperation between organs of the legislature and the executive, 
along with the country’s central bank. 
This kind of vision for the NSC emerged as too idealised, and was 
thus condemned to failure. Indeed, day-to-day, long-term political rival-
ries took the upper hand over the idea of a new institutionalised form 
of cooperation being put in place to allow the key people in the state 
to cooperate over a matter of fundamental importance to that state’s 
functioning. The consequence was thus for Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
to suspend the operations of the Council, which therefore met 
once only20.
Ultimately ending in failure, the attempt to flesh out the operation 
of the NSC as a coordination-and-consultation body would ensure that 
President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, once sworn in for his second term, 
elected to apply a  different “key” as he appointed Council members. 
The mixed nature of its composition is to be discerned readily enough, 
with Members including both people with expert knowledge and others 
with skills and competences in “security” as conceived of broadly, this 
being an aftermath of these people once having held key posts in the 
public authorities and services active in the security field, as well as the 
Armed Forces. Some Council Members also took up key posts as organs 
of state authority (Prime Minister or Minister) even after they had been 
appointed. 
Meanwhile, this time round, President Kwaśniewski’s appointments 
to the Council were of people representing or sympathising with the 
camp he himself had originated in. Through the NSC coming to acquire 
this kind of cooperation, the opportunity was put in place for it to play 
20 For a  broader treatment, see: K. Gąsiorek, T. Kośmider, J. Pawłowski, Instytucje doradcze 
i sztabowe głowy państwa polskiego zajmujące się problematyką bezpieczeństwa, [in:] T. Kośmider 
(ed.), Organy doradcze głowy państwa właściwe w sprawach bezpieczeństwa narodowego, Warsaw 
2015, p. 154.
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a role as an advisory organ21 of expert type features, albeit under a lim-
ited pluralism of political outlook.
It emerged that the concept of the second National Security Council 
to be called into being by Aleksander Kwaśniewski was actually a very 
effective one. Nevertheless, his successor as President, Lech Kaczyński, 
just a couple of days into the Presidency resorted to the kind of selection 
key for members that actually resembled the one Kwaśniewski had relied 
on almost 8 years earlier. Those called upon to sit on the body were hold-
ers of key state posts as Marshals (Speakers) of Sejm and Senat, the Prime 
Minister in the role of Chair of the Council of Ministers, and the Deputy 
PM who was at one and the same time Minister of the Interior and 
Administration, as well as the Minister of National Defence. The Coun-
cil was also joined by somebody who was little more than a rank-and-file 
MP at that time – Jarosław Kaczyński (i.e. the President’stwin brother). 
In 2006, the composition of the NSC was augmented to include the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, the “key” for selecting Council Mem-
bers that President Lech Kaczyński applied could come as no real surprise 
to astute observers of Poland’s political scene – for it was even signalled 
prior to the Presidential Campaign in 2005. Campaign materials at that 
point read that: W  sprawach szeroko rozumianego bezpieczeństwa państwa 
i  obrony narodowej korzystać będę ze współpracy Rady Bezpieczeństwa Nar-
odowego, do której powołam osoby pełniące najwyższe funkcje w kraju, a także nie 
pełniące takiej funkcji, ale mające zasadniczy wpływ na bieg życia publicznego22 
(“in matters of state security and national defence as broadly conceived, 
I  shall be drawing on cooperation with a National Security Council to 
which I will appoint persons holding the top posts in the country, or else 
not in such posts but having a key influence on the course of public life”).
The first part of Lech Kaczyński’s Presidential term coincided with 
a period of PiS in government. In this connection, the adopted mecha-
21 Anna Chorążewska writes: … prezydent zrezygnował z koncepcji Rady jako ciała politycznego na 
rzecz koncepcji Rady jako zaplecza merytorycznego prezydenta w zakresie bezpieczeństwa państwa 
(“the President left behind the concept of the Council as a political body, in favour of a con-
cept for the Council of its being substantive backup for the President where state security 
was concerned”). Cited after: A. Chorążewska, Model prezydentury w  praktyce politycznej po 
wejściu w życie Konstytucji RP z 1997 r., Warsaw 2008, p. 178. Even as one may share the view 
of the author of this quote regarding the vision for the Council that Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
adopted at the start of his second Presidential term (as substantive backup and support), 
there is at the same time no way of avoiding the idea that this is a body political in its nature. 
22 Deklaracja wyborcza Lecha Kaczyńskiego Silny prezydent – uczciwa Polska, [in:] I. Słodkowska, 
M. Dołbakowska (eds.), E. Nalewajko (Introduction), Wybory prezydenckie 2005. Programy 
kandydatów [i.e. Manifestoes of the Candidates at the 2005 Presidential Election], Warsaw 
2007, p. 110.
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nism for selecting members of the NSC had a different impact, despite 
being ostensibly similar to the one from 1998. For Council Members 
were representatives of that (“Law and Justice”) formation from which 
the President hailed, or else were people from beyond that grouping, but 
holding given posts in the state with his support (examples were Bogdan 
Borusewicz and Radosław Sikorski). The NSC was then to represent “the 
face of the consolidation of the ruling camp around the President of the 
Republic of Poland”23.
It is interesting that, while PiS were in government, through the 
2005–2007 period, there was quite considerable turnover in ministe-
rial and other posts (not least Marszałek of the Sejm). Newly-appointed 
people became NSC Members almost automatically, though their pre-
decessors stayed on on the Council for several months (or even up to 
a year) before being recalled from this post. It can thus be recognised 
that the means of selecting NSC Members adopted in 2005 was not 
applied very consistently at all by Lech Kaczyński as President. This 
may in turn attest to the limited significance he ascribed to the body. In 
contrast, there was an abrupt change in the President’s way of perceiv-
ing the Council’s role from the moment his brother Jarosław became 
Prime Minister. While the time in operation of the government under 
PM Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz had been associated with an NSC that 
“was to play an important political and symbolic role [signalling – R.G.] 
that there were fields of key importance for the security of the state 
in which the President exerted an initiating and mobilising impact on 
the government”24, the appearance of the government led by successor 
Jarosław Kaczyński limited the significance of that function, and thus 
marginalised the National Security Council.  
Between March 2007 and February 2008, Lech Kaczyński dismissed 
seven of the ten members of the NSC, with the reason being loss of 
support on the part of Prawa i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice), depar-
ture from a state post that had been held, or loss of the Head of State’s 
confidence. It was in this way that the Council, as Włodzimierz Fehler 
put it: przerodziła się w wąski klub »politycznych przyjaciół« prezydenta25 
(“transformed into a narrow club of ‘political friends’ of the President”). 
Remaining members at that time were: Jarosław Kaczyński, Anna Fotyga 




25 W. Fehler, Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego…, p. 241.
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and Aleksander Szczygło. Following the 2007 handover of power as 
a  coalition between Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) and Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe (the Polish Peasants’ Party) came into office, the 
President did not then call into being a Council whose makeup reflected 
the holding of key posts in the state by politicians. Thus the original 
“key” to the process by which members were selected emerged as attrac-
tive solely in conditions where political uniformity was in place in Presi-
dential, governmental and parliamentary circles at one and the same 
time. Where it was co-habitation that applied, this proved impossible 
to maintain or sustain. So political considerations once again prevailed 
over the idea to create a strong body serving joint action between people 
holding the most visible state posts in security as broadly conceived. At 
the same time, the political reality offered strong verification of what the 
Presidential candidate had said prior to the election.
It would also be hard to recognise that the NSC of the Lech Kaczyński 
Presidency became any kind of real advisory organ. Directly following the 
nomination of its first Members, the Council certainly had potential in 
the advisory sphere, if far more strategically than substantively. However, 
as time passed the fact that there was window-dressing at work here 
became more and more clear. 
Bronisław Komorowski then appointed a National Security Council of 
new makeup while he was Marshal of the Sejm but standing in to per-
form the duties of the late (tragically killed) President Lech Kaczyński. 
He proceeded on an assumption known from the past, that those sitting 
on the NSC should hold key state posts, or else be leaders of the par-
liamentary parties26. While the leaders of the parties that happened to 
form the coalition government did have key posts of their own, the fact 
that the invitation to join the Council extended to leaders of Opposi-
tion parties might really be regarded as a kind of novelty. The Sitting 
of the NSC convened on May 20th 2010 comprised the Marshal of the 
Senat, the PM, the Deputy PM who was also Minister of the Econ-
26 This was in line with what can be found in a document dated May 10th 2010 made ready by 
Head of the Bureau of National Security, Stanisław Koziej, and entitled Propozycje dla Prezy-
denta RP w sprawie reformy kierowania bezpieczeństwem narodowym i obronnością (tezy) (a thesis 
making a proposal to the President in the matter of the reform of governance in National 
security and defence). This included an idea for convening an NSC made up of all the key 
post-holders where the security of the state was concerned (“…powołać Radę Bezpieczeństwa 
Narodowego w składzie uwzględniającym udział wszystkich najważniejszych z punktu widzenia bez-
pieczeństwa państwa osób funkcyjnych”). Cited after: S. Koziej, Rozważania o bezpieczeństwie. 
O bezpieczeństwie narodowym Polski w latach 2010–2015 w wystąpieniach i referatach szefa Biura 
Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Warsaw 2016, p. 16.
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omy, the Ministers of Internal Affairs and Administration and National 
Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Head of the Bureau of 
National Security. Equally, appointed leaders of parties that were not at 
the same time holding key posts in the state were Jarosław Kaczyński 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – Law and Justice) and Grzegorz Napieralski 
(Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – the Democratic Left Alliance). In this 
way, the organ appeared first and foremost in a  coordination-and-con-
sultation mould, with a clear pluralism where the political views of its 
Members were concerned. This of course seemed entirely justified in 
the immediate aftermath of the Smolensk air disaster (involving the 
Presidential plane) which had killed the President and many other senior 
administration figures on April 10th 2010.
Later as President of Poland, Bronisław Komorowski decided to 
pursue further the line he had taken to shape the composition of the 
National Security Council. The mixed makeup noted in this case (with 
both key post-holders in the state from the legislature and the executive 
and representatives of a broad spectrum of political forces in Parliament) 
reflected a  conviction as to the need for: “consensus to be obtained 
among all political forces, when it came to the political will to treat 
matters of national security within state policy as of priority significance 
(…) National security has to come before and beyond all (party) political 
divisions; and this is a foundation for the effectiveness of all other stra-
tegic activity (operations) within the security sphere (…) A good place 
to forge a political understanding in security matters that goes beyond 
party divisions is the National Security Council, in whose work there 
participate those accountable under the Constitution for state security, 
but (…) also leaders of all political forces represented in Parliament”27. 
There was thus an understanding here that the NSC was to be a forum 
at which to exchange views on security and to seek consensus in matters of 
fundamental importance to the country. Did this broad formula adopted 
for participation on the NSC not limit the opportunities for this body to 
act in an advisory capacity vis-à-vis the President? Doubts appearing in this 
connection were in fact increased by the way in which dynamically-ongo-
ing change in political rivalries and fluctuations (better perturbations) on 
Poland’s party-political scene ensured a need for incessant changes of per-
sonnel on the NSC. In fact, the total number of NSC Members at different 
times during the (one-term) Presidency of Bronisław Komorowski was 26.
27 Cited after: Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warsaw 2013, 
pp. 156–157.
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Unlike his predecessors, President Andrzej Duda was slow in set-
ting up “his” National Security Council, taking more than half a  year 
to achieve that objective (the relevant Ordinance in this matter was not 
signed until March 2nd 2016). However, like Komorowski, Duda adopted 
a  broad formula when it came to the organ’s composition. Alongside 
those holding top posts (the Marshals of Sejm and Senat; Prime Minis-
ter; and the Ministers responsible for defence, home affairs and foreign 
affairs; the Head of the President’s Chancellery and the Head of the 
Bureau of National Security), further invitees were the heads or chairs 
of parliamentary floor groups28. 
There is thus a basis here for recognising that President Duda was 
promoting a vision of the NSC as an organ-forum that would tend to play 
host to exchanges of view, with understandings in matters of national 
security being developed against that kind of background. This would 
be the way to consolidate the NSC’s position as a coordination-and-con-
sultation body. At the same time, having in mind the relative lack of 
plurality of the parliamentary-party system during the second decade of 
the 21st century, it proved possible for the Council to feature a majority 
of Members associated with the camp holding power in Poland. 
On the basis of what it has proved possible to establish regarding 
the makeup of versions of the National Security Council as set up by 
successive Presidents, conclusions to be drawn are as follows:
1. At no time was the NSC an apolitical advisory body sensu stricto, able 
to harness the knowledge, skill and competences of all members in 
order to offer a President fully professional good advice.
2. The Presidencies of both Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Lech Kaczyński 
can be seen to have featured clear attempts to seek out an optimal 
model where the role and significance of the National Security Coun-
cil were concerned.
3. It was during the Presidencies of Bronisław Komorowski and Andrzej 
Duda that there was a crystallising-out of the concept of the NSC as 
a coordination-and-consultation body to the holder of the highest post 
in the state where matters of security in that state were concerned. 
However, this is not a typical advisory body (or organ), but more of 
a  forum for the exchange of ideas and for cooperation between dif-
ferent political camps and circles. It may constitute a valuable source 
28 Cited after: Zarządzenie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 marca 2016 r. w  sprawie 
składu i trybu działania Rady Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, § 2 point 7, https://www.prezydent.
pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/art,143,posiedzenie-rady-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego---9-marca.
html (27.12.2020).
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of information for the President, e.g. in regard to ways of looking 
at defined questions; while its Members (if not all of them) lack 
attributes typical for advisors, most notably an appropriate level of 
professional knowledge.
The frequency with which Council Sittings 
have been convened
As was noted above, the period under analysis witnessed 57 Sittings 
of the National Security Council, though with quite varied annual totals 
– as the diagram makes clear. The organ met most times in 2010 and 
2012 (7 each), while not meeting at all in 1999–2000, 2005, 2008–2009 
and 2017–2019, and convening just once in both 1998 and 2007. No 
specialised knowledge is required to realise that the times of low or 
zero activity on the part of the NSC were by no means times in which 
events directly or indirectly impinging upon the security of the state did 
not take place, either in the nearer or more-distant surroundings of the 
Polish political system or even within that system itself.
The lack of activity of the NSC in the years 1998–2000 (just one Sit-
ting over the course of three years) reflected the failure of the adopted 
concept for the organ to pass muster in the circumstances of co-habita-
tion. Furthermore, there were even at that time doubts of a legal nature – 
as to whether the President could in fact call upon other key organs of the 
state (like the Marshals presiding in the “Speaker”-type role over Sejm and 
Senat) to take a seat on this one. It was indicated that the act nominating
Fig. 1. Frequency with which the National Security Council worked in the years 
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a person ought to relate to the particular individual, rather than the post 
held29. The result of this was for matters of a purely political nature (plus 
those legal question marks) to ensure – as Krystian Nowak put it – that 
the NSC was reduced to the status of a purely “decorative” body30.
It would thus be during the second term of President Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski that the position of the NSC within Poland’s system of 
governance would crystallise rather – in the direction of true advisory 
organ. The frequency with which Sittings took place was among the 
signals attesting to this fact.
The utterances of Lech Kaczyński during the 2005 election campaign 
raised reasonable expectations that the position of the NSC within the 
system would be strengthened as and when he took on the Head of 
State post. One campaign material in particular informed voters that, 
as President, Kaczyński would be conceiving of the Council in a broad 
way, ensuring that its sittings (to be held regularly) would be discussing 
each and every issue linking up with serious threats to the sovereignty 
of Poland, or its public or economic life, or its society (Zadania Rady 
będę rozumiał szeroko, omawiając na jej posiedzeniach, którym nadam charak-
ter regularny, wszystkie zagadnienia związane z poważnymi zagrożeniami dla 
naszej suwerenności, naszego życia publicznego, gospodarczego i społecznego)31. 
Meanwhile, in the course of his Presidency, just four Sittings of the 
National Security Council actually took place – and that a time when the 
grouping in power in Poland was the same party as the one the President 
himself originated from (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). 
Following the 2007 coming to power of a Civic Platform/Polish Peas-
ant Party coalition, the advisory organ to the President in matters of the 
country’s internal and external security did not meet even a single time. 
This was surprising enough, given the way that President Lech Kaczyński 
had been devoting rather a lot of his activity to the safeguarding of the 
sovereignty and security of the state, especially in the context of the 
policy of Russia has been pursuing in the region. But this substantive 
aspect was subsumed in all of the political rivalry. President Kaczyński 
simply saw no possibility of institutionalised cooperation being engaged 
in – even via the NSC – with a camp in opposition to the one from which 
he originated (and which was in part originated by him). 
29 W. Odrowąż-Sypniewski, Opinia w sprawie udziału Marszałka Sejmu w Radzie Bezpieczeństwa 
Narodowego, «Przegląd Sejmowy» 1998, no. 3 (26), p. 79.
30 K. Nowak, Kompetencje głowy państwa w zakresie zwierzchnictwa nad siłami zbrojnymi i bezpie-
czeństwa państwa w polskim prawie konstytucyjnym, Rzeszów 2016, p. 254.
31 Deklaracja wyborcza Lecha Kaczyńskiego…, p. 110.
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There was therefore a  fundamental questioning of the NSC’s posi-
tion within the system of governance of Poland, even as the first half of 
the 21st century’s first decade had seen the institution better and better 
embedded, and serving as a key forum at which issues relating to secu-
rity in the broadest sense could be taken up. This truth was perfectly 
encapsulated by Deputy Head of the Bureau of National Security (in 
the years 2008–2010) – Witold Waszczykowski – he stating that Lech 
Kaczyński konsultuje się z Radą w sposób mniej formalny, m.in. przez wymianę 
poglądów, raportów, opinii. Więc formalne posiedzenia wydają się zbędne32 
(“Lech Kaczyński is not consulting with the Council in any more formal 
way – e.g. through exchanges of views, or via reports and opinions. Thus 
formal Sittings of the Council would not seem to be necessary”). And 
here it is worth recalling how the second half of the term in office of Presi-
dent Kaczyński coincided with the NSC then being of markedly curtailed 
structure. Sitting on the Council along with the Head of the Bureau at 
that time were two people not holding any major state-official posts.
Andrzej Duda only made very sparing or “economical” use of the 
NSC during his first term as President. As in the first period during 
which Duda-mentor Lech Kaczyński had been in office, the Council met 
just four times. That said, it needs to be noted how basically the entire 
term of Duda coincided with Prawo i Sprawiedliwość being in power in 
general, even as the NSC was known to be a Council on which people 
holding key state posts sat. That meant that most of the organ’s mem-
bers derived from the political circles close to the Head of State. Yet 
despite that, there were four years (between June 2016 and March 2020) 
when not a single NSC Sitting was convened. For, when it came to his 
options for seeking advice and engaging in consultations, the President 
showed a clear preference for narrower channels of communication con-
fined to his own close political circles. 
Thus, while Opposition figures in Parliament many times demanded 
that Sittings of the NSC be convened, the President saw no need for that 
to happen. And in that way he closed off options for those Opposition 
politicians who actually had seats on the Council to play much or any part 
in the discussions on security provided for within the framework of an 
organ of the state defined and identified in the Constitution33. There is 
32 A. Dąbrowska, G. Rzeczkowski, Jak działa BBN, „Polityka”, 12th December 2009, https://
www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1501461,1,jak-dziala-bbn.read (2.01.2021).
33 In January 2020, A. Duda responded to a question regarding the lack of convened NSC 
Sittings by suggesting it was a matter of state secrets being protected. He opined that 
there were irresponsible people spreading information classed as confidential “(…) są ludzie 
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thus no doubt that the position of the NSC was marginalised during the 
time of Andrzej Duda’s Presidency. Indeed, this is confirmed in the utter-
ances of his Spokesperson, Błażej Spychalski, who noted in early 2020 
that: “Many Opposition politicians try to show how the National Security 
Council is some kind of ‘WOW-body’ at which stances will be arrived at 
jointly. (…) In fact it is an advisory and consultative body to the President 
of Poland. Were the President to anticipate consultation and advice on 
some broader scale than actually takes place, he would convene the Coun-
cil. But since the President does not anticipate these kinds of decisions 
today, he does not convene it.” (Wielu polityków opozycji próbuje przekazać, 
że Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego jest jakimś takim »wow ciałem«, na którym 
się będzie stanowiska wspólnie docierało. (…) To ciało doradczo-konsultacyjne 
prezydenta RP. Gdyby pan prezydent oczekiwał konsultacji, doradztwa w jakimś 
szerszym zakresie, niż to ma miejsce, to Radę Bezpieczeństwa by zwołał, ale 
ponieważ pan prezydent nie oczekuje takich decyzji dzisiaj, to nie zwołuje34). 
If the frequency of sittings of the Council is seen as one of the indica-
tors of the body’s significance or relevance to the President of Poland’s 
pursuit of one of his/her fundamental tasks, then it would definitely 
be Bronisław Komorowski in that post who paid it special attention. 
He convened it four times even as Marszałek of the Sejm acting in the 
absence (following the tragic death) of Lech Kaczyński. But after being 
elected to the post of President, Komorowski convened sessions of the 
Council as many as 31 times. 
Noting the composition of the body over the time Komorowski was 
President, it is possible to regard the NSC as having become a  forum 
for cooperation and an exchange of views between that President and 
people dealing with the stance of the state as expounded (as well as the 
leaders of Opposition parties) – in matters of the Polish state’s external 
and internal security35. As was made clear in an interview he gave, Gen. 
nieodpowiedzialni, którzy wynoszą informacje, które są informacjami tajnymi. Działamy tak, żeby 
informacje, które są informacjami niejawnymi, pozostały informacjami niejawnymi. (…) to jest moja 
decyzja kiedy zwołuję Radę Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego (…)”. In: Prezydent Andrzej Duda ws. 
RBN: działamy tak, by informacje niejawne pozostały niejawnymi, https://www.wnp.pl/parlamen-
tarny/spoleczenstwo/prezydent-andrzej-duda-ws-rbn-dzialamy-tak-by-informacje-niejawne-p
ozostaly-niejawnymi,49510.html (2.01.2021).
34 Cited after: Duda nie zwoła Rady Bezpieczeństwa ws. Iranu. Rzecznik: Opozycja próbuje przeka-
zać, że to jakieś „wow ciało”, https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114884,25565944,d
uda-nie-zwola-rady-bezpieczenstwa-ws-iranu-rzecznik-opozycja.html (2.01.20210).
35 This conclusion is not even altered by the fact that Jarosław Kaczyński as leader of the 
largest Opposition grouping resigned from NSC work in 2010. For a broader treatment see: 
E.  Żemła, E. Olczyk, Jarosław Kaczyński rezygnuje z RBN, «Rzeczpospolita», 10th Novem-
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Stanisław Koziej (Head of the Bureau of National Security at the time 
Komorowski was President) saw sittings of the NSC as an occasion to 
“correct certain ideas that different Ministers came along with”. The 
General likewise stressed the Council’s relevance when it came to stra-
tegic decisions and future challengers36. What is therefore being revealed 
here is an NSC that is primarily of a coordinating nature. 
To sum up this aspect of the considerations, it needs to be noted 
how the frequency with which sittings of the Council are convened can 
represent a key element by which the President’s relationship with the 
organ can be described and summed up. Nevertheless, an immeasur-
ably important factor determining whether sittings were or were not 
called was naturally the situational context. It was first and foremost con-
crete circumstances that decided on a meeting of the NSC taking place. 
Equally, it was basically only under Bronisław Komorowski as President 
that sittings of this body became a more permanent element of Poland’s 
political reality. It was therefore in this way that an institutionalisation 
of the NSC in political practice was achieved, with the Council at that 
time attaining the rank of pluralistic coordination-and-consultation body 
close to the supreme representative of the Polish state. However, bases 
for assuming the Council’s arrival at true “institutional” status were also 
to be observed during President Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s second term 
of office, though it is impossible not to notice how he failed to convene 
even a single sitting of the body during his last year as President. 
It thus emerges that there is no full confirmation in practice of the 
hypothesis regarding frequent use being made of the “assistance” of 
the NSC when there was political coincidence between the President 
and most of the people involved on it. The experience during Andrzej 
Duda’s time as President makes this abundantly clear. Nevertheless, 
less use does seem to be made of the NSC under the circumstances 
of co-habitation. This is first and foremost associated with a more and 
more established practice of “inviting” on to the Council those who 
hold “exposed” posts in both the legislature and executive (see Table 1). 
This kind of relationship would certainly not have been present had the 
makeup of the NSC been determined on the basis of the “key” proposed 
by Aleksander Kwaśniewski at the beginning of his second term.
ber  2010, https://www.rp.pl/artykul/561892-Jaroslaw-Kaczynski-rezygnuje-z-RBN.html 
(2.01.2021).
36 Po co prezydentowi Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego. Z  gen. Stanisławem Koziejem rozmawia 
Dariusz Jaroń, https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/tylko-u-nas/news-po-co-prezydentowi-rada-bezp
ieczenstwa-narodowego,nId,2146505 (2.01.2021).
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Table 1. The frequency of occurrence of sittings of the National Security Council 































































































1998–2000 2000–2005 2005–2007 2007–2010 2010 2010–2015 2016–2020
Relationship between the President of Poland and the majority in Parliament 
(government)
co-habitation conformity conformity co-habitation conformity conformity conformity
Political conformity or disparity between the President and the NSC
disparity conformity conformity conformity conformity conformity conformity
Numbers of NSC sittings
1 13 4 0 4 31 4
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
By taking as a point of reference the frequency with which NSC Sittings 
were held in the years 1998–2020, it is possible to note that the “assistance” 
of the organ was sought least often by Presidents of Law and Justice pedi-
gree. This may reflects this political formation’s lack of trust (and the lack 
of confidence of certain of its representatives) in “work in” and “cooperation 
with…” bodies and organs of a politically pluralised nature.
The subject matter at Sittings of the National Security Council
When the subject matter of Council Sittings is in turn analysed, it is 
possible to note how, during the Presidency of Aleksander Kwaśniewski, 
there was a  prevalence of matters associated with external security, 
with the military dimension to the fore in particular (NATO member-
ship, involvement in the “War on Terror”). In turn, Lech Kaczyński’s 
Presidency also saw matters of this kind addressed by the work of the 
NSC, even as matters of energy security were also raised. Bronisław 
Komorowski as Acting Head of State convened Sittings of the Council 
to discuss matters of the flooding taking place in Poland in 2010, as well 
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as of course the issue that had brought him to a President-type position 
in the first place – the plane crash at Smolensk leading to the deaths 
of all 96 on board (including many key figures in Polish administration 
travelling alongside Lech Kaczyński and the First Lady). 
Post-election, Bronisław Komorowski as President had meetings of 
the Council devoted to a  rather wide range of topics. These included 
participation in NATO structures and the shaping of the EU’s Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy, cybersecurity, reform of the system by 
which the Armed Forces (and Security Services) of Poland were being 
managed and commanded, the (re)organisation of the system by which 
VIP figures in Poland were to travel by air, the security arrangements 
for the large-scale jointly-hosted event that was Euro 2012, and – again 
– matters of Poland’s energy security. 
In general, it would be a  justified claim that – under President 
Komorowski – the National Security Council of the Republic of Poland 
became a forum for cooperation between the Head of State and holders 
of key state posts, as well as leaders of the main political groupings; and 
this, not merely in regard to the country’s external security (and from 
dimensions also above and beyond the military), but also when it came 
to internal security. 
It at first seemed that Andrzej Duda might keep up this practice, 
but – following in 2016 two sittings of the Council (of which one was 
subject to secrecy), the President may no further use of its advisory 
services until 2020. Thus, at the end of his first term in office, Duda 
elected to convene sittings of the NSC twice. Needless to say, this was 
in response to the threat posed by the developing pandemic caused by 
the SARS-CoV2 coronavirus.
Joanna Juchniewicz noted how: bardzo często temat posiedzenia był 
konsekwencją określonych wydarzeń i  nie tylko wydarzeń mających miejsce 
w państwie polskim, ale również wydarzeń o zasięgu międzynarodowym37 (“it 
was very often the case that the subject of a Sitting was a consequence 
of defined events – and not only those taking place in Poland, but also 
those of international scope”). However, it can still be emphasised that 
the Council did not only meet in the face of sudden happenings (in 
the international arena, and more rarely in its domestic counterpart), 
given that some Sittings were planned in advance, while the possibility 
of further meetings being convened was often signalled in this way by the 
Head of State (most especially where that Head of State was Bronisław 
37 J. Juchniewicz, Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego…, p. 126.
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Komorowski). Furthermore, there were certain topics that appeared again 
and again at NSC Sittings, while others were (seemed to be) more or 
less of an incidental nature. However, all of the topics can be seen to fall 
within 6 groups, as follows:
Table 2. Subject matter of the NSC Sittings held in the years 1998–2020 (through 
to the end of President Andrzej Duda’s first term)
NATO and 
the EU
 Poland’s NATO membership: 2, 3, 4, 22, 24, 26, 34, 45, 47, 
51, 53, 55
 Preparations for NATO Summits or debriefings following 
participation at them: 4, 22, 24, 31, 34, 47, 51, 53, 55
 The EU Common Foreign and Defence Policy: 39, 42, 53
 Poland’s integration with the EU: 2
 The Polish Presidency over the EU Council: 29
Regional and 
global problems
 The Coalition of the Willing and the War on Terror, 
the counteraction of terrorism in general: 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 
22, 32 
 Poland’s energy security: 15, 16, 27, 28, 30, 40
 Maritime policy: 14
The situation in 
states and regions 
of the world
 Ukraine: 3, 13, 15, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 51
 Russia: 6, 15, 16, 25, 46, 48, 51, 52
 the USA: 5, 12, 18
 Iraq: 10, 12
 Afghanistan: 22, 32 
 The Middle East in general: 1






 Anti-missile defence: 3, 4, 18, 35
 Discussion over government strategies, reviews and plans, 
as well as other documents relating to state security: 11, 36, 
41, 49
 Cybersecurity: 28, 29, 48, 50
 Reform of the system of management and command of 
the Armed Forces and/or special services: 33, 38, 40
Internal policy
 Flooding: 19, 20
 The Smolensk aviation disaster: 21, 37
 Establishing new rules for the carriage of key persons in 
the state, and relevant equipment purchases: 23, 40, 41
 Ensuring security at and for EURO2012: 31, 34
 Ensuring security at and for the World Youth Day: 55
 Counteracting the effects of the coronavirus pandemic: 56, 57
Other  General meetings / secrecy of deliberations: 17, 54
Numbers in this Table correspond with numbers of Sittings of the NSC included in the Annex. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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The above compilation shows how internal security dominated sit-
tings of the National Security Council. Within that category, most time 
was devoted to military matters. However, it is also worth noting the 
kinds of problems that held sway as the NSC was doing its work during 
successive Presidential terms. In the schematic representation above, the 
visualisation was based on the dual criteria of external versus internal 
security, as well as military versus non-military aspects.
Scheme 1. Dominant subject matter at 1998–2020 sittings of the National Security 
Council (through to the end of President Andrzej Duda’s first term) 
Numbers reflecting the numbering of National Security Council Sittings used in Annex, while the 
letters are the initials of those holding the office of President of Poland. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
As this scheme shows, the Sittings of the National Security Council 
during the terms in office of Presidents Aleksander Kwaśniewski and 
Lech Kaczyński were dominated by matters of external state security. 
While in the case of the former it was first and foremost military aspects 
that were involved, in regard to the latter, there was a balance between 
security’s military and non-military aspects. During the Presidency of 
Bronisław Komorowski, the subject matter at NSC sittings was dif-
ferentiated, and concerned with security as conceived broadly. As the 
schematic representation makes clear, problems addressed were located 
in each of the four segments. What is more, it was more typical at this 
time than earlier on for the NSC to be convened to discuss problems the 
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Head of State had himself indicated, with this meaning less of a reaction 
to the situation in the nearer or further surroundings of the Polish politi-
cal system. This allowed the NSC to become a proactive participant in 
work on the security of the state as conceived of more broadly. But this 
valuable feature was to be lost once again during the time of Andrzej 
Duda’s Presidency.
Summary
It emerges that the wording of the Polish Constitution that has the 
National Security Council termed organ doradczy (translated into Polish 
semi-officially as “advisory organ”) is not especially precise. While the 
task of indicating what an advisor is or should be is not an especially 
difficult one, it seems to be incredibly complicated to actually organise 
an advisory organ or body. And the challenge proves especially huge 
where the political sphere is involved.
Over the more than 20 years that the NSC has been in operation, 
no cohesive vision regarding this “organ” has emerged. Where the 
composition of the NSC in the second decade of the 21st century is 
concerned, a practice has now become well-established whereby those 
invited on to the Council are state office-holders and leaders of parlia-
mentary parties. This denotes a body of a coordination-and-consultation 
nature, while not saying much about any advisory capacity in the strict 
sense.
Taking account of the frequency with which Sittings of the NSC were 
convened, it is possible to risk claiming something about the degree 
of importance to each given President in office. Looked at in this way, 
Bronisław Komorowski emerges as the one making most use of the pos-
sibility. Furthermore, during his time in office, the Council very much 
appears in the role of proactive, as well as reactive, body. This allows it to 
be considered that the NSC played an important role in the President’s 
discharge of his function within the Polish system of governance as some 
kind of “guardian” of state security. In the years 2010–2015, the Council 
was not only a venue for discussion on state security to be pursued, as 
it also played an important role in the actual devising and development 
of certain decisions.
In turn, Presidents of Law and Justice origin only rather rarely availed 
themselves of the “assistance” the NSC is there to provide. Indeed, 
those looking into the policy practice during the Presidencies of Lech 
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Kaczyński and Andrzej Duda will find themselves asking a fundamental 
question as to the sense of advisory bodies receiving special treatment 
under the Constitution. For would that status not tend to denote obliga-
tory convening of bodies of this type, at least from time to time? Equally, 
does an organ assumed from the outset to be of advisory status not 
become merely decorative where the very entity who is to extend support 
to such an organ is in reality sceptical towards it?
Where the subject matter taken up by the NSC is concerned, it is 
easy to note an initial focus on defence that gave way steadily to more 
and more non-military aspects of security. This is only right, given the 
true nature of security as a multi-stranded phenomenon. But in conse-
quence, the justification is present for a broad institutional environment 
to be put in place in support of those who bear responsibility for this 
area of state functioning.
Keeping in mind the three areas referred to above, it needs to be 
argued that the real nature of the National Security Council is dependent 
on the vision presented for that organ by the person holding the Head 
of State office at the given time. Equally, it emerges that a  significant 
relevant determinant is the context denoted by the model of political 
rivalry that holds sway. Thus, over the 1998–2020 period, political prac-
tice was such as to offer no basis for a cohesive model for the NSC to 
crystallise out. 
The Council did not become an advisory organ or body sensu stricto, 
even as it is perceived by a broad group of political actors as above all 
a forum at which views can be presented, talks held and standpoints and 
stances developed. The conceptualisation here is therefore more one of 
a coordination-and-consultation body, even if there is no way of avoid-
ing the conclusion that this has been a key centre acting in support of 
the sitting President, most of all during Bronisław Komorowski’s time 
in office.
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Annex
Numer Data Subject matter at Sittings of the National Security Council
Council Sittings convened by Aleksander Kwaśniewski
1 20.02.1998 The situation in the Persian Gulf, integration with NATO structures, meeting of the Weimar Triangle in Poznań.
2 18.01.2001
The consequences of Poland’s NATO and EU memberships. The 
process of globalisation and other threats to external and internal 
security.
3 22.02.2001 A European anti-missile defence system (within the NATO framework). The situation in Ukraine.
4 7.06.2001
Polish-US relations. Poland’s stance at the Brussels NATO Summit. 
NATO membership and enlargement. The US anti-missile defence 
system. The situation in the Balkans.
5 19.09.2001
An assessment of the international situation and the threat posed 
to state security in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attack 
on the USA.
6 11.01.2002 Polish-Russian relations
7 4.04.2002
Actions of the “Coalition of the Willing” developing after the 
September 11th 2001 attacks on the USA (and Poland’s role therein). 
The situation in the Middle East.
8 5.09.2002 The War on Terrorism. The threat of weapons of mass destruction being used.
9 19.02.2003 The preparedness of the Polish state to counteract and neutralise threats linked to international terrorism.
10 25.03.2003 The situation surrounding the Iraq conflict.
11 8.09.2003 The Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP strategic document.
12 16.01.2004 Polish-US relations. Poland’s participation on the stabilisation mission in Iraq
13 18.03.2004 Polish-Ukrainian relations. Counteraction and reaction in the event of a terrorist attack using a bioweapon.
14 24.05.2004 Operations at Poland’s ports in the context of the entry into force of the SOLAS Convention (for the Safety of Life at Sea).
Council Sittings convened during the Presidency of Lech Kaczyński
15 2.01.2006 State energy security in the light of the “Gas Crisis” in Ukraine.
16 22.05.2006 The planned diversification of supplies of gas to Poland. Threats arising from the plans to construct a North European Gas Pipeline.
17 8.09.2006 Ongoing state-security issues and principles for cooperation with allies.
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Numer Data Subject matter at Sittings of the National Security Council
18 27.03.2007 American proposals for the deployment to Poland of elements of an anti-missile system.
Council Sittings convened by Sejm Marshal Bronisław Komorowski as acting Head of State
19 20.05.2010 The flood situation and help for those affected by this natural disaster.
20 27.05.2010 The flood situation and help for those affected by this natural disaster (discussion of draft “Anti-Flooding Acts”).
21 1.06.2010
Familiarisation of NSC Members with black-box data from the 
Presidential Tu-154M aircraft crashing near Smolensk on April 10th 
2010.
22 24.06.2010 Poland’s strategy towards Afghanistan. Work on the Polish stance for the NATO Summit in Lisbon.
Council Sittings convened during the Presidency of Bronisław Komorowski
23 29.09 2010
The NSC Report on principles and procedures relating to the safety 
of the carriage by air of persons holding key state posts.
24 9.11.2010 The Polish stance at the NATO Summit
25 24.11.2010 Polish-Russian relations
26 20.01.2011 The Alliance contingency plan developed for Poland within the NATO framework.
27 24.03.2011 Poland’s energy security
28 28.04.2011 Nuclear safety. Cybersecurity.
29 30.05.2011 Cybersecurity. Matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy as a priority for Poland’s EU (Council) Presidency.
30 15.09.2011 The project involving an Odessa-Brody-Płock pipeline in the context of Poland’s energy security.
31 19.01.2012 Security during the EURO 2012 Football Championships.
32 15.03.2012 Poland’s stance for the Chicago NATO Summit. The operational strategy for Afghanistan.
33 3.04.2012 Reform of the system of management and command of the Polish Armed Forces as well as military training.
34 16.05.2012 The system of security during the EURO 2012 Football Championships. The Polish stance for the Chicago NATO Summit.
35 12.09.2012 The concept for anti-missile defence within Poland’s overall air-defence system.
36 8.11.2012 The results of the Strategic Review of National Security.
37 19.12.2012 Chances of the investigation into the Smolensk disaster being manipulated.
151SP Vol. 61 / STUDIA I ANALIZY
The National Security Council (Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego) – an advisory organ…
Numer Data Subject matter at Sittings of the National Security Council
38 16.01.2013 Assumptions underpinning the reform of the management and command of the Polish Armed Forces.
39 4.03.2013 An attempt to develop a  Polish stance in matters of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
40 17.06.2013
Poland’s energy security. Equipping the Polish Armed Forces with 
aircraft ensuring the strategic mobility of the most important organs 
of state governance. Reform of the Special Services.
41 16.10.2013 The Republic of Poland’s National Security Strategy. The purchase of aircraft for VIPs.
42 20.11.2013 Poland’s stance in regard to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
43 2.12.2013 Polish-Ukrainian relations and support for Ukraine’s efforts to integrate with the European Union.
44 22.01.2014 Polish-Ukrainian and EU-Ukrainian relations.
45 26.02.2014 Poland’s NATO membership. Polish-Ukrainian and EU-Ukrainian relations.
46 3.03.2014 An effort to devise a  Polish stance in the face of the developing Russian-Ukrainian crisis and Russian plan to annex Crimea.
47 9.09.2014 Results of the NATO Summit in Newport, UK.
48 22.10.2014 The Russia-Ukraine crisis. Assumptions underpinning Poland’s cybersecurity strategy.
49 10.12.2014 The Government National Security Strategy as it concerns strategic strengthening of Poland’s system of security.
50 12.01.2015 Poland’s Cybersecurity Doctrine.
51 18.02.2015 Preparing Poland for the Warsaw NATO Summit. Opportunities for a peaceful resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
52 18.03.2015 Analysis of assumptions underpinning Russia’s war doctrine, as well as its potential consequences for the security of Poland.
53 1.07.2015 The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Preparations for the Warsaw NATO Summit.
Council Sittings convened during the first Presidential term of Andrzej Duda
54 9.03.2016 Poland’s security (protected by security and confidentiality provisions, so no details).
55 7.06.2016 Preparations for the Warsaw NATO Summit. Ensuring the security/safety of World Youth Day participants.
56 10.03.2020 Policy seeking to counteract the coronavirus pandemic.
57 23.03.2020 The proposed “anti-crisis shield” seeking to limit negative economic consequences arising out of the pandemic.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
